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Abstract 
The Accrual basis of accounting has always found favour amongst corporate practitioners 
of earnings management. There have been extensive studies on earnings management, 
focusing on earnings hazards. This paper contributes to the literature by showing market 
inclination to accrual basis of accounting as motivated by a desire for earnings 
management. It analyzes the sample units’ performance in regard to accrual-indicators vs. 
cash-indicators and their pervasiveness on stock pricing in India. In India, the corporate 
ownership model is the Promoter Dominated Shareholders Model (PDSHM) which makes 
this study unique in highlighting earnings management motivation. The units show a 
market preference for accrual numbers and motivation for earnings management as clear 
in their stock pricing behavior. I hope the study improves investors’ perception of the 
reliability of a firm’s performance, as measured by earnings. It is of use to the users of 
financial accounting and corporate finance globally for rationalizing the motivation behind 
earnings manipulation by the management. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The purpose of financial statements is always to report to the various stakeholders to help 
the management’s performance evaluation. This is where the accrual system of accounting 
assumes high importance. It is considered superior to others though it has been constantly 
challenged by cash-flow accounting. The challenge by cash-flow accounting is more on 
the importance and efficacy of accrual accounting and a shift toward the cash flow 
approaches in security analysis (Hawkins & Campbell, 1978). The question about the 
superiority of accrual accounting over cash-flow accounting is concerned with the 
objectives and the nature of financial reporting, i.e. the accrual system of accounting is 
preferred for its objective of Earnings management. That said, earnings management is a 
strategy that can be used by the management of a company to deliberately manipulate the 
company's earnings to meet a pre-determined target. This practice is carried out with the 
help of accrual accounting. Goel's (2012) study evaluates the implications of discretionary 
accruals for earnings management in the Indian corporate enterprises. His analysis 
indicates the presence of accrual related earnings management in the units studied.  
 
Thus, the main objective of this discussion is to examine empirically the relative merits of 
accounting indicators from both accrual and cash-flow accounting in terms of their 
persistence and variability for stock behaviour with regard to earnings management. 
 
India saw two large corporate scams namely Satyam and Kingfisher in 2009 and 2012 
respectively. It not only led to financial loss for the shareholders but also disturbed the 
status quo of the entire financial system.  Incidence of any such scam opens up to question 
the effectiveness of the governance framework and the quality of reported earnings. It 
requires a change in the regulatory regime. India had its transformation process in the form 
of new Companies Act, 2013 after a gap of 57 year since old Companies Act, 1956. This 
will act as a reference point globally and is the key to this study's relevance. 
 
In the US there is a shareholder model of corporate governance. Countries like Japan have 
a coordinated model. But, in India companies witness Promoter Dominated Shareholders 
Model (PDSHM) with strong control of promoters.  In the private sector, most of the 
companies are family-owned businesses with largest shareholder holding over 50%. This 
calls for a special attention to the motivation of earnings management and its detection at 
an early stage.  
 
However, there have been limited studies which explored the quality of earnings in the 
Indian context. This study evaluates the quality of reported earnings of Indian companies 
operating globally. The policy makers in India have amended clause 49 of Listing 
Agreement to inculcate sound governance practices among Indian corporate. This makes 
the present study important and timely. Also, a recent study by (Pathak et al., 2014) 
stresses that each country has ‘its own standards, regulations and culture’, and there is a 
need to explore earnings management –  in that specific context.    
 
The paper contributes to the literature by studying the market response to the basis of 
accounting for detecting earnings management in Indian companies. This effect has been 
examined with the help of accounting indicators in the selected corporate enterprises. 
Further, their variability and persistence have been checked to test the degree of earnings 
management evidences.   
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Next section presents a detailed literature 
review of related concepts for developing our predictions about earnings management. 
Subsequent section explains the sample selection procedure, research methodology and 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the results of the analysis with section 5 
concluding the paper. Section 6 and 7 present the limitations of the study and implications 
for future research. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
 
 
Definitions of earnings management 
 
Earnings management by companies has long been documented in the academic literature. 
Management of reported earnings is a major accounting concern both for academia as well 
as industry (Dechow & Skinner,  2000).  
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) state that earnings management occurs when managers 
have a discretionary behaviour related to accounting numbers with or without limits and 
this behaviour can be adopted to maximize the value of the company. Many surveys have 
been published on the topic (Barnea etal.,1976; Imhoff,1977; Ronen & Sadan,1981; Healy 
& Whalen, 1999; Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Stolowy & Breton, 2004). (Shipper, 1989) 
says that earnings management is “ . . . a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain . . .”  (Healy & Whalen, 
1999, p.368) explain that earnings management occurs when managers use discretion to 
manipulate financial information “. . . to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on reported accounting numbers.”  
 
In this line, García Lara et al. (2005) prove that earnings management is an intentionally 
carried out management practice, opportunistic and/or educational, with the purpose to 
report desired results, distinct from the real ones. Scott (2009) determines earnings 
management as “the choice of accounting policies or actions that can affect earnings to 
achieve a specific objective. ”  
 
Consistent among these definitions is the notion of intentional manipulation of reported 
numbers by management. In a nutshell, Earnings management is ‘accrual management’, 
i.e. use of accruals to achieve a pre-determined target. 
 
 
Motivations of earnings management 
 
(Burgstahler etal., 1997) provide systematic evidence that firms increase reported earnings 
to achieve various incentives. The widespread use of accounting information by 
investors and financial analysts to help value stocks can create an incentive for 
managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short-term stock price 
performance. The question arises - Do firms manage earnings for stock market 
purposes? (DeAngelo, 1988) reports that earnings information is important for 
valuations in management buyouts and hypothesizes those managers of buyout firms 
have an incentive to "understate" earnings. 
 
The findings show that firms report positive (income-increasing) unexpected accruals 
prior to seasoned equity offers (Teoh, Welch,  & Wong 1998b), initial public offers 
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(Teoh, Welch, &Wong 1998a, Teoh, Wong, & Rao 1998).Other Prior studies on 
accrual earnings management (AEM) around US IPOs provided mixed results 
(DuCharme, Malatesta, & Sefcik, 2001; Darrough & Rangan, 2005; Ball & Shivakumar, 
2008; Billing & Lewis, 2010). 
 
Overall, the wealth of evidence on the stock-market effect of earnings numbers clearly 
indicates that, despite concerns about earnings management, investors view earnings 
as value-relevant data that is more informative than cash flow data. This finding has 
been replicated over long periods of time and in many countries. It suggests that 
investors do not view earnings management as so pervasive as to make earnings data 
unreliable. This interpretation is confirmed by Dechow's (1994) findings that current 
earnings are better predictors of future cash flows than are current cash flows.  
 
Earnings management’s link with insider trading is documented by (Beneish& Vargus, 
2002), (Park & Park, 004) and (Cheng & Warfield, 2005). Other studies document the 
relationship between earnings management and stock compensation through stock options 
(Baker et al, 2003), (Bartov& Mohanram, 2004), (Kwon &Yin, 2006). 
 
(Graham et al., 2005) argued that managers preferred real earnings management to 
accrual-based earnings management because accrual manipulation was more likely to be 
scrutinized by external auditors and regulatory bodies while real activities manipulation 
had a lower chance of being detected. Moreover, (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008) found that 
companies switched from accrual-based to real earnings management after the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002.  
 
Recent literature suggests that possible earnings management strategies at the time of SEO 
issuance and in other settings are not just limited to overstatement of accruals, but can 
include manipulation of real activities (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010, Zang, 2011, Badertscher, 
2011). 
 
Furthermore, research avenue in earnings management is the investigation of the drivers 
for the choice of one practice over the other and to explain the reason such as an IPO or 
financial distress situations (Cohenet al.,2008; Campa & Camacho-Miñano, 2015). 
 
Methods of earnings management 
 
In earnings management, the issue of measuring the effects of managers' use of 
accounting discretion in accounting method choices is inevitable. There are two 
techniques commonly recognised to manipulate earnings: accrual manipulation or real 
activity manipulation (Schipper, 1989). Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) check 
depreciation estimates and bad debt provisions surrounding initial public offers. They 
find that, on a matched sample of non-IPO firms, sample firms are more likely to 
have income-increasing depreciation policies and bad debt allowances in the IPO 
year and for several later years.  Beneish (2001)
 
 discussed the analytics for income-
increasing earnings management, income-decreasing earnings management and specific 
contexts, e.g. financial institutions with regulatory constraints.  
 
(Cohen & Zarowin, 2010) focuses on three issues: whether managers manipulate earnings 
via both accruals and real activities; how firms’ tradeoff between accrual and real earnings 
management, and the economic consequences of accrual and real earnings management 
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around SEOs. The results show that firms use both AEM and REM around SEOs, and 
these firms outperform their industry peers in the period prior to SEOs and underperform 
their peers following SEOs.  
 
(Zang, 2011) proposes that the relative extent to which managers engage in real activities 
manipulation versus accruals manipulation reflects the costs associated with either 
strategy. 
 
The  research focused on accrual manipulation represents the most significant part in 
earlier literature. The studies have mainly used accruals manipulation as a proxy for 
earnings management, total accruals can be split across discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals in the models most frequently proposed by earlier research (i.e. 
Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986;Jones, 1991; Dechow et al.,1995; Kothari, Leone & 
Wasley, 2005). 
 
Even though, the aggregate accrual models have been widely criticised (i.e. Kothari et al., 
2005; Ibrahim, 2009), and even though they have some limitations, they still remain the 
most used by researchers in this area (Ibrahim, 2009). 
 
Gap areas 
 
These review articles focused mainly on accounting choices, in the form of accruals, 
exercised by the management for designing earnings. Overall, there is remarkably little 
evidence on earnings management for motivational reasons, suggesting that this is a 
fruitful area for future research. As mentioned in the introductory part, the present study 
examines the effect of accounting indicators on stock pricing and finds out the motivation 
for earnings management to investigate and test timely.  
 
 
 
III. Research Design 
 
Hypothesis 
 
The implied hypothesis is that the accounting data is derived from either an accrual 
accounting system or a cash-flow accounting system.  
 
The accounting indicator most favored by the market and/or reflected in the                              
market price will show less variability and a higher persistence than the other numbers. 
The rationale is that the nature of the association between the derived accounting numbers 
and the behavior of security prices indicates which method the market perceives to be the 
most related to the information used in setting equilibrium prices. 
 
So, the method that produces accounting numbers having the association with security 
prices, with the least variability and the highest persistence, is the most consistent with the 
information that results in an efficient determination of security prices. Thus, hypothesis 
for the present discussion is: 
 
Ha   – The accounting indicator derived from accrual system is most favored by the  
        market. 
 
The evidence on the nature of the association is also essential regardless of the efficiency 
of the market. It is an important factor in any accounting policy regardless of the nature of 
the policymakers’ views about other issues, including market efficiency. 
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Objective of the study 
 
The study specifically aims at the following:  
• To examine the relative merits of accounting indicators derived from  
      either an accrual or cash-flow accounting system in terms of variability and    
      persistence to stock prices, and 
 
• To test the motivation for accrual behaviour and highlight the existence of earnings 
management in these undertakings for necessary regulation. 
 
 
 
Research methodology of the study 
 
Following research methodology is used in the present study.  
 
Sample Design & Approach 
 
The present study covers the private listed companies in India, excluding the government 
undertakings and banks & financial institutions because of their distinct regulatory 
mechanism. The enterprises have been chosen by their performance in terms of profit 
generation (PAT performance) for the year 2007-08 as per ET October, 2007 Survey, on 
select basis. Two criteria were used for the selection of the companies in the final sample. 
First, the enterprises should be in the private sector. Second, its accounting and market 
data, both were available for the study. Out of top twenty five corporate enterprises which 
were considered for the sample, only twelve met the sampling need. They contribute  a 
significant part of India’s market size and are constituent of BSE's Sensex like Dow Jones 
of NYSE. Therefore, ‘case based’ research approach has been followed here. A list of 
these companies appears in Appendix I. 
 
Period of the Study  
 
The period to be covered in the present research study is of five years, ranging from 2003-
04 to 2007-08. It has been taken as:  
 
(a) it is meaningful to focus the attention on earnings management  practices of the  
     enterprises chosen and detect the various grey areas with regard      
     to accruals management, around global recession.   
 
(b) further, a five year period is enough to show the short-term and long- term changes 
     and let the valid conclusions. 
 
Data Used 
 
For the purpose of the present study, the main data used is secondary in nature keeping in 
the nature of the study. The study employs both accounting and market data. The 
accounting data was obtained from the annual reports of the units and other such records 
for the relevant period. Market data for the units was obtained from the BSE site. 
 
 
Tools / Techniques Used 
 
Earnings management indices, developed specifically for detecting the accrual motivation 
in the context of earnings management, have been used in the present study.  
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Accounting Indices 
The three semi accounting indices of rate of return are used for a comparison of the 
relative merits of accrual and cash accounting. 
     a. A cash-flow per share/stock price ratio is used to represent the cash  
         accounting- derived  semi accounting index of rate of return. 
     b. A common equity per share/stock price ratio is used to represent the accrual    
         accounting- derived and balance sheet-oriented semi accounting index of rate  
         of return. 
     c. An earnings per share/stock price ratio is used to represent the accrual  
         accounting-  derived and income statement-oriented semi accounting index of  
         rate of return. 
 
 
 
The cash flow per share/stock price of security i for time period t, is defined as: 
 
CFPi,t      =     
 
 
where, 
Pi,t  = Price of security i at the end of period t adjusted for capital changes such as stock 
splits and stock dividends. 
CFOi,t  = Cash flows from operations calculated by adjusting net income for non cash 
charges (credits) and for changes in the current accounts, of firm i in period t. 
CSOi,t  = Common shares outstanding of firm i in period t. 
 
The common equity per share/stock price of security i for time period t is defined as: 
 
CEPi,t      =    
 
where, 
 
CEPi,t  = Common equity of company i at the end of period t. Common equity represents 
common stock plus retained earnings. 
 
 
The earnings per share/stock price of security i for time period t, is defined as: 
 
EPSPi,t      =    
 
 
where, 
 
EPSi,t = Earnings per share (primary), excluding extraordinary items, of company i for 
period t. 
EPS represents the primary earnings per share figure as reported by the company. 
 
Each of these numbers, CFPi,t , CEPi,t  and EPSPi,t represents numbers that are derived 
from either an accrual or a cash-flow accounting system and related to the stock price and 
whose merits will be evaluated in terms of variability and persistence. They represent 
semi accounting indices of rate of return derived from either an accrual or a cash-flow 
accounting system (Barley& Levy, 1979, p. 307). 
 
The accounting indicators derived from an accrual accounting system included both a 
CFOi,t  / CSOi,t 
        Pi,t 
 
CEi,t  / CSOi,t 
       Pi,t 
 
EPSi,t 
  Pi,t 
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balance sheet-oriented number and an income statement-oriented number. The indicators 
also had two basic characteristics. First, they are computed as per share numbers, and 
second, they are ratios whose dominator is the market price of a share. The first 
characteristic is used to check comparison between the indicators and the companies. The 
second characteristic is used to ensure that the indicator reflects both accounting-based 
performance and market-based numbers. A second argument for dividing the accounting-
based datum by the market price of a share reflects the belief that the accounting datum 
should be evaluated in terms of the impact on its relationships to the market price.  
 
 
Statistical Tools 
 
Statistical tools have been used for testing the results, including correlation analysis –
Spearman's Rank correlation coefficient, bar charts, graphs (time series), and descriptive 
statistics. 
 
 
IV. Results and Discussion 
 
 
Variability of the Derived Accounting Indicators 
 
The three accounting indicators, namely, the cash flow per share/stock price (CFP), the 
common equity per share/stock price (CEP), and the earnings per share/stock price 
(EPSP), were computed for the sample companies for the years 2003-04 to 2007-08. 
These indices of rate of return are used for a comparison of the relative merits of accrual 
and cash accounting. 
 
The means, standard deviation, and coefficients of variation of these numbers are 
presented in Table 1 and figure 1. In addition, this table includes a ranking of the 
coefficients of variations of the derived accounting indicator numbers. 
 
 
Table 1 
CEP, EPSP, and CFP’s Means, Standard Deviations, and Coefficients of Variation 
for the Sample Companies, 2003-04 to 2007-08 
 
                      CEPi                        EPSPi                   CFPi 
Co. Mean S.D. C.V. R Mean S.D. C.V. R Mean S.D. C.V. R 
RIL 0.40 0.11 27.75 9 0.07 0.02 28.56 6 0.12 0.07 55.76 5 
Sterlite 0.30 0.12 40.82 3 0.03 0.02 62.47 1 0.01 0.05 523.07 1 
TCS 0.08 0.04 51.66 2 0.04 0.01 36.42 5 0.03 0.01 31.45 10 
Tata Steel 0.41 0.12 29.16 7 0.13 0.03 21.22 12 0.16 0.04 24.07 11 
Bharti Airtel  0.12 0.04 29.32 6 0.03 0.01 59.80 2 0.05 0.03 58.70 3 
Infosys 0.11 0.03 30.96 5 0.04 0.01 27.30 8 0.04 0.01 35.03 9 
Wipro 0.12 0.04 33.17 4 0.03 0.01 26.89 9 0.03 0.01 35.67 8 
ITC  0.19 0.05 27.95 8 0.05 0.01 25.48 10 0.05 0.02 41.20 7 
Hindalco 0.67 0.17 25.04 11 0.12 0.05 39.02 4 0.12 0.07 56.88 4 
L&T  0.20 0.12 58.31 1 0.05 0.03 54.20 3 0.03 0.02 51.26 6 
Tata Motors 0.24 0.06 26.74 10 0.07 0.02 28.06 7 0.11 0.10 86.42 2 
Grasim  0.34 0.05 14.18 12 0.07 0.02 21.89 11 0.09 0.02 19.87 12 
 
 Notes: 1.S.D. stands for standard deviation. 
          2. R stands for ranking 
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Figure 1 
Variability of Accounting Indicators for the Sample Companies, 
2003-04 to 2007-08 
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  Note: CEP, EPSP and CFP denote average coefficient of variation here. 
 
 
An examination of Table 1 shows a definite difference in the variability of these numbers. 
The variability of the CFP numbers exceeds the variability of the CEP and EPSP 
numbers. More precisely, the coefficients of variation of the CFP’s numbers are higher 
than those of the CEP and EPSP numbers in seven cases .The coefficients of variation of 
the CEP numbers were higher than those of the EPSP and CFP numbers in three cases. 
The coefficients of variation of the EPSP numbers were higher than those of the CEP and 
CFP numbers in only two cases. Those differences are, in most cases, prominent. 
 
For those cases where the variability of CEP and EPSP numbers exceeds those of the 
CFP numbers, the differences are either small or do not show any specific pattern. The 
variability of the CFP numbers, as measured by their coefficients of variation, ranges 
from a high of 523.07 for Sterlite Industries to a low of 19.87 for Grasim Industries. The 
main reason for such high variation in Sterlite can be attributed to negative CFP in 2004-
05 and 2006-07. If we exclude Sterlite’s variability in total CFP coefficient, even then 
CFP’s total variability is still the highest at 41.36 among all three variables.  
 
The average variability of the CEP is 32.92 and EPSP’s is 35.94. The variability of the 
CEP numbers ranges from a high of 58.31 for L&T to a low of 14.18 for Grasim. Finally, 
the variability of the EPSP numbers ranges from a high of 62.47 for Sterlite to a low of 
21.22 for Tata Steel. 
 
So, the variability of CFP number exceeds the variability of CEP and EPSP numbers, 
both in degree and the number of companies. It indicates low market preference for cash-
based indicators. 
 
Next, the relationship between the distributions of the CEP, EPSP and CFP variables was 
examined by computing Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient between these 
distributions. The computed correlation between CEP and EPSP variables is equal to 0.76 
which is significant at 0.01. Also, the computed correlation between CEP and CFP 
variables is equal to 0.68 which is significant at 0.05. Finally, the computed correlation 
coefficient between EPSP and CFP variables is equal to 0.85 which is significant at 0.01 
level. Thus, it may be concluded that in spite of the differences in the variability of EPSP, 
CEP, and CFP numbers, there is some correlation between them. This relationship 
becomes considerable for pricing issues. 
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The main question created by these results refers to the possible reason(s) that the 
variability of cash accounting-based numbers (CFP) exceeds for a large number of firms in 
the sample those of the income statement-oriented numbers (EPSP) and the balance sheet-
oriented numbers (CEP). In other words, cash based indicators have shown more 
variability than accrual based indicators. This indicates market preferences for accrual 
based indicators in stock pricing. 
 
One reason may stem from the fact that EPSP numbers show the earning potential of the 
company and are based on accounting data, which are more likely an object of 
discretionary accounting income smoothing, and of the smoothing process inherent in the 
very definition of accounting income. It may be stated first that the income smoothing is 
easier and more lucrative with income figures than cash-flow accounting data, and second, 
that managers may have a greater incentive in smoothing income figures given the 
stronger links between accounting income and the firm’s reward structure. As a result, the 
market is reflecting a “high reported” income figure which might be different from the 
“actual” one, which may explain the variability of cash flow- based numbers. 
 
A second reason may be that the market, is attaching more importance to the balance 
sheet position after income statement and then cash flow. The superiority of the balance 
sheet over cash-flow data may be due to a selective market response either due to the 
higher familiarity with balance sheet data than cash-flow data or basically due to a 
balance sheet fixation and a stronger interest in the financial position of the firms. 
                                                       
Persistency of Derived Accounting Indicators 
 
The persistency of the derived accounting indicator numbers was determined by 
examining the median rank correlation between the accounting indicator number in the 
year of formation and the same number in later years.
 
Table 2 and figure 2 and Tables 1, 
2 and 3 in Appendix II show consecutively the median rank correlation of all the sample 
companies’ CEP, EPSP and CFP with the CEP, EPSP and CFP in later years. 
 
 
Table 2 
Median Correlation of Accounting Indices of Sample Companies, 
2003-04 to 2007-08 
 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
CEP with CEP  
in subsequent years 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 
EPSP with EPSP  
in subsequent years 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
CFP with CFP  
in subsequent years 
1.00 1.00 0.41 0.71 0.58 
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Figure 2 
Persistency of Accounting Indices of Sample Companies, 
2003-04 to 2007-08 
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 The median correlation of the CEP numbers shown in Table 1 (Appendix II) remains 
same at 1.00 for next three years after formation. In the last year, it decreases to 0.70. 
Also, its correlation has been significantly high at 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively, 
which again verifies the fact of persistency.  
 
The median correlation of the EPSP numbers shown in Table 2 (Appendix II) remains 
same at 1.00 for next three years after formation. In the last year, it decreases to 0.50. 
Like CEP, its correlation has also been significantly high at 0.01 and 0.05 levels 
respectively, which verifies persistency.  
 
The median correlation of the CFP numbers shown in Table 3 (Appendix II) shows a 
fluctuating trend as compared to other variables. It remains at 1.00 for next year after 
formation. Then, it decrease from 1.00 to 0.41 in 2005-06, increases to 0.71 in 2006-07 
and then again decreases to 0.58 in the last year of formation (2007-08). The degree of 
correlation is comparatively low. So, it shows less persistency.  
 
The results show a good persistency in the EPSP and CEP numbers and a low persistency 
in the CFP numbers. Again the main question refers to the possible reason(s) that the 
persistence of the income statement –oriented (EPSP) and balance sheet-oriented (CEP) 
accrual numbers exceed that of the cash-flow accounting-based number (CFP).The two 
reasons given for the variability results may apply to the persistence results, namely, the 
income smoothing hypothesis and the selective market response hypothesis. 
 
The high variability of CFP, as shown in the preceding discussion, is further verified by 
the median rank correlation here. The accrual based indicators, i.e. EPSP and CEP have 
shown less variability and high degree of persistency. So, the market response is more 
favorable for accrual-based indicators. 
 
 
 
V. Conclusion    
                                     
The key characteristic of finance function is the stewardship function. Financial statements 
help the evaluation of management’s stewardship to the end-users. It is obvious that the 
accrual system finds a favour for reporting as compared to others on account of this fact. 
There was a definite difference in the variability of the accounting indicators of the sample 
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companies, viz. the cash flow per share/stock price (CFP), the common equity per 
share/stock price (CEP), and the earnings per share/stock price (EPSP). The variability of 
the CFP numbers exceeded the variability of the CEP and EPSP numbers in seven cases. 
The variability of the CEP numbers was higher than those of the EPSP and CFP numbers 
in three cases. The variability of the EPSP numbers was higher than those of the CEP and 
CFP numbers in only two cases. The variability of CFP number exceeded the variability of 
CEP and EPSP numbers, both in degree and number of companies.  
 
So, cash based indicators showed more variability than accrual based indicators. This 
indicates market preferences for accrual based indicators in pricing of securities. Further, 
EPSP shows the earning potential of the company and the earnings management is easier 
and more lucrative with income figures than cash-flow accounting data. As a result, EPSP 
finds a favour from the market. 
 
But in spite of the differences in the variability of EPSP, CEP, and CFP numbers, a 
significant relationship is found between them, as clear in rank correlation results. It brings 
out that all these indicators influence each other directly or indirectly in stock pricing. 
 
The persistency of the derived accounting indicator numbers was determined by 
examining the median rank correlation between the accounting indicator number in the 
year of formation and the same number in later years. The results show a good 
persistency in the EPSP and CEP numbers and a low persistency in the CFP numbers. It 
again verifies the persistency of the income statement –oriented (EPSP) and balance 
sheet-oriented (CEP) accrual numbers than of the cash-flow accounting-based numbers 
(CFP).  
 
It is clear that the income statement-oriented and balance sheet-oriented accrual 
accounting-based numbers showed a lower variability and a higher persistence than the 
cash-flow accounting-based numbers. So, it can be inferred that stock market signals 
more favourably to accrual numbers than cash-based numbers. Since, companies are 
governed strongly by stock market motivations therefore they tend to follow accrual 
accounting for exercising earnings management choices. The results are consistent with 
earlier research on quality of earnings (Goel, 2014). Thus, it calls for an effective forensic 
audit regulation for the stakeholders’ interests at large 
 
VI. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
 
There are some limitations of this study which could be categorized as under: 
 
The present study could be confined to only top twelve profit-making corporate 
enterprises in the private sector in India out of selected 25 enterprises, leaving all other 
enterprises due to data non-availability. The PSUs and banks & financial institutions had 
to be excluded due to their distinct regulatory mechanism. Though the selected companies 
constitute a significant size of BSE’s market capitalization for completeness of data, still 
the size can be extended for further study with regard to country –level results and global 
outreach for earnings management. 
 
The time period in the study is of five years (2003-4 to 2007-08) to highlight earnings 
management motivation. This period is best suited to show the effects of global recession 
on the practice of earnings management in India. Researchers may like to select a different 
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time-period based on their perspective.  
 
Earnings management scope can be further examined, apart from stock pricing behaviour, 
for other motivational parameters in the light of growing investors’ awareness about 
accrual reported numbers. 
 
 
VII. Implications for Future Research 
 
 
The findings of this study are important to standard setters and regulators as the sample 
companies are constituent of BSE's Sensex. It highlights the need for an effective 
regulation for detecting earnings management. There is a strong need to have well-defined 
policies and regulatory mechanism with respect to prevent and detect earnings 
management practices at an early stage 
 
Standard-setting bodies can consider the attributes of assets and liabilities and changes in 
them also with the fundamental process of measurement of income. In short, the evidence 
argues for a revenue/expense and asset/liability view of earnings, rather than the cash-flow 
view of earnings. 
 
The findings of this study are significant not only for organisations that function in India 
but also for other companies globally as the sample companies are multinationals.  
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                                     Appendix I 
                  Index of Companies Included in the Study 
 
  S.NO.            COMPANY   PAT (2007) 
   Rs. Crore 
1. Reliance Industries Ltd. 12,075 
2. Sterlite Industries Ltd. 4,386 
3. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. 4,213 
4. Tata Steel Ltd. 4,177 
5. Bharti Airtel Ltd. 4,062 
6. Infosys Technologies Ltd. 3,856 
7. Wipro Ltd. 2,942 
8. ITC Ltd. 2,755 
9. Hindalco Ltd. 2,687 
10. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. 2,251 
11. Tata Motors Ltd. 2,170 
12. Grasim Industries Ltd. 1,968 
 
            Source: ET 500, The Economic Times, New Delhi, October, 2007. 
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                                           Appendix II  
                         Rank Correlation of Companies’ Accounting Indices  
 
                                                            Table 1 
Rank Correlations of All the Sample Companies’ CEPs with CEPs in Subsequent 
Years, 2003-04 to 2007-08  
 
Base Year 
                       Years Following Base Year 
1 2 3 4 5 
2003-04 1.00 0.91 0.86 0.70 0.39 
2004-05  1.00 0.97 0.87 0.70 
2005-06   1.00 0.93 0.72 
2006-07    1.00 0.82 
2007-08     1.00 
Median 
Correlation 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 
 
                                                          Table 2 
Rank Correlations of All the Sample Companies’ EPSPs with EPSPs in Subsequent 
Years, 2003-04 to 2007-08  
 
 
Base Year 
                       Years Following Base Year 
1 2 3 4 5 
2003-04 1.00 0.89 0.70 0.67 0.46 
2004-05  1.00 0.82 0.80 0.50 
2005-06   1.00 0.89 0.82 
2006-07    1.00 0.80 
2007-08     1.00 
Median 
Correlation 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
 
 
 
                                                         Table 3 
Rank Correlations of All the Sample Companies’ CFPs with CFPs in Subsequent 
Years, 2003-04 to 207-08  
 
 
Base Year 
                       Years Following Base Year 
1 2 3 4 5 
2003-04 1.00 0.66 0.33 0.65 0.65 
2004-05  1.00 0.41 0.88 0.68 
2005-06   1.00 0.41 0.16 
2006-07    1.00 0.75 
2007-08     1.00 
Median 
Correlation 
1.00 1.00 0.41 0.71 0.58 
 
